Realism and Other Philosophical Mantras

Robert C. Sutton

In the October, 1992 issue of Inquiry there appeared an interesting article, "Epistemology and Pedagogy," by Donald Hatcher. This paper was followed in the February 1993 issue by my critical essay, "The Right Method?" Published in this issue of Inquiry is Dr. Hatcher's response to the questions and concerns which I raised in that paper. In responding to my concerns, Hatcher's latest effort is, in many ways, much clearer than his first. Nevertheless, his position is still a bit confusing to me, and, in an effort to examine the sources of that confusion, I would make a few observations.

Considering the Obvious

As in the first article, Hatcher points out "...that in the history of philosophy there has been an obvious relationship between some thinkers' favored epistemology and their educational practices."(p.29) As examples, Hatcher refers to Plato’s dialectic pedagogy arising from his epistemological commitment to the idea of the Forms and Descartes’ educational experience of competing truth claims and values leading to the formulation of his epistemic radical doubt. From these two examples Hatcher concludes that "...at least in these instances, the history of philosophy shows a relationship between a thinker's favored epistemology and his or her views on education, especially pedagogy. That's about all one can say." (p.29) Such is his modest observation. As modest as this seems, I am already confused over what, exactly, the "obvious relationship" is, especially in light of his statement: "That is about all that one can say." Hatcher could be intending for us to agree with any or all of the following:

(1) We claim that there is an "obvious" coincidental or supposed necessary relationship between epistemology and pedagogy found in two Western philosophers.

(2) That a relationship exists between epistemology and teaching is a claim that at least two Western philosophers have asserted to be "obvious."

(3) The relationship between epistemology and pedagogy ought to be "obvious" to philosophers who have not made that claim when other philosophers make that connection.

(4) What is knowledge and teaching is "obvious," as is the relationship between them, and we can find a way of describing these terms and their relationship that is accurate and true.

Initially, I understood Hatcher to mean "obvious" in the sense of either number (1) or (2), as a comment about the history of philosophy. But, his subsequent position regarding the relationship between epistemology and pedagogy seems to be much stronger, justifying metaphysical statements about education, the nature of human beings, knowledge, language, truth, the Western University, and the world.

In Hatcher's efforts to say more, he argues that there is a necessary relationship between epistemology and teaching, as evidenced in Western philosophy. If one adopts a "realist" epistemology, then one is free to employ numerous educational practices and set various educational goals. Here I have simply and positively restated the relationship between realism and pedagogy that Hatcher negatively states as follows: "...if one is a realist, there is no clear relationship between one's epistemology and one's educational practices."(p.30) Such freedom is granted the realist since there exist objective facts, truths, and values(p.29-30) that provide an ahistorical structure which determines the basis, limits, and methods of legitimate inquiry and rationality itself.

One might object that my "positive restatement" is more a contradiction of what Hatcher actually says. However, such a positive restatement is warranted in light of Hatcher's assertions regarding the relationship between an anti-realist epistemology and pedagogy. He asserts that an anti-realistic, postmodern epistemology entails, if one is consistent, a pedagogy that is "...void of meta-disciplinary standards for evidence and judgements.., "(p.30) resulting in an inability to fix the criteria for determining the identity of disciplines and the meta-disciplinary rules that make inter-disciplinary inquiry possible.(p.34) Furthermore, educators who adopt an anti-realist epistemology"...must withhold all judgement..." since they deny "...objective truth and values."(p.30) The adoption of this post-modern epistemology would then undermine the goal of creating rational, autonomous, moral agents and erect an educational edifice that would be "...mere indoctrination or ideological bamboozlement..."(p.32)

Thus, it would appear that the "obvious" relationship between epistemology and pedagogy is that an educator who adopts a realist epistemology is generally free to adopt various pedagogical aims or practices provided that such aims and practices stay within the constraints of objectivity in order to attain more objective facts, truths, and values. On the other hand, the anti-realist educator, if consistent, could only adopt educational aims and practices that are "...educationally destructive, and psychologically impossible."(p.32) Thus, Hatcher's claim that there is no relationship between epistemology and pedagogy is not an accurate presentation of his actual views on the subject.

On Hatcher's reading of the issues, if the anti-realist, postmodern educator claims to be able to make reasonable judgements, such a claim would be inconsistent with his/her anti-realist epistemology. This is so since judgements entail a realist epistemology, even if it is only a realism with a fallibilist twist. While these arguments appear somewhat circular and question-begging, there are even more important issues to discuss.

In reading and in lectures, I commonly find the claim being made that persons who have adopted a postmodern, anti-realist epistemology deny that there is such a thing as truth. This common assertion is meant to discredit postmodern anti-foundationalism and anti-universalism and it is employed to show postmodernity's inherent contradictory nature since postmodern thinkers would insist that their own views are reasonable and true. At this point, the discussion could move to counterclaims being made concerning the contradictions inherent in a realist epistemology but, once again, such arguments are really pointless. What is more significant, it seems to me, is the issue of whether or not an anti-realist, postmodern epistemology actually entails the denial of truth. Is it not rather the case that what partly motivates this epistemic position is the observation that there are, indeed, a variety of cultural, ethnic-, gender-, and disciplinary-specific claims about what kinds of statements are true and reasonable and what kinds of criteria and methods are to be employed in determining which propositions have those two attributes? Thus, a postmodern epistemology does not entail the rejection of standards to measure judgements and propositions. Instead, it includes a recognition of a host of local and particular standards that measure various forms of discourse and rejects the role of being the usher which puts the fields and domains of inquiry in their proper place and the judge of truth which establishes the proper boundaries and limits of knowledge found throughout a culture.“1 In short, if discussions about the importance of truth and its nature are themselves important, that will be so on the basis of the contexts in which these conversations are held and not on the basis of metaphysical warrant. It is precisely on this epistemic point that Hatcher's position runs aground.

When Hatcher claims that

To deny the existence of objective truth entails that, of the various interpretations or theories about how things are, no interpretation in any group of inquirers, discipline, or culture can be better or worse in any objective sense than any other. (p.30)

This statement is banally true. The real issue is Hatcher's unproven and unjustified belief that "objective truth" is either essential to or the only basis for saying, "X is better or truer than Y." The burden of proving and justifying this claim rests with Hatcher. He must shoulder the same burden with his red herring that anti-realism's denial of objectivity is to be equated with denying that some judgements are better than others. Given modernity's failure to attain the philosopher's grail of objective truth, I doubt that Hatcher will succeed in proving either of these claims. But the question I address to him and other knights of truth is, "What real difference does ‘objective truth’ make?” After all, it has been the belief in the idea of objective truth that was once useful in producing knowledge and not objective truth itself. Even Hatcher does not, because he cannot, defend realism based upon realistic, epistemic warrant. Instead, he attempts to justify realism on psychological and moral grounds or, in other words, on "pragmatic" bases. Realism, like many items of the past, has outlived its usefulness since, once having acknowledged and openly stated that the emperor wears no clothes, it is hard to pretend he does.

It should be further and quickly noted that many postmodern philosophers have pointed out that most inquiries and efforts at understanding in our life-worlds are neither exclusively, nor even for the most part, directed toward finding the truth, defining its nature, nor even establishing criteria so it might be recognized should it ever be found. Everyday discussions, even those within the academy, include denotative, prescriptive, valuative, and expressive communicative actions. Truthfulness and reasonableness are just two, but in no wise identical, criteria by which utterances can be questioned; but there are other ways of evaluating propositions. Members within communities of interpreters can interrogate each other's statements. For example, we often make inquiries to determine if others have described efficient ways of doing things or recommended states of affairs and actions that we and other members of our community would recognize as just, good, or beautiful. If I have described what most of us would recognize as practices in which we and others like us engage, then which of these competing truth claims, criteria of evaluations, methods of inquiry, and uses of judgements, sentences, and narratives found among various communities of interpretation are the true and correct ones and which ones are the false ones? And, given this diversity, it is obvious to any reflective philosopher that there cannot be a transcendental position that he or she can take up which will lead others who are committed to their own beliefs and practices, based upon other transcendental grounds, to accept merely on the basis of a supposed objectivity.

Historically, it has been the hope of philosophers to find the appropriate method by which local, particularistic truth claims (opinions) could be transcended, arriving at universal truth. Such a philosophical method would require the proper application of right forms of reasoning and inquiry. In this hope, philosophers have seen themselves as bearers of the ancient Olympian torch passed down to them ever since the Delphic oracle said that Socrates was the wisest person alive. Bearing this torch, Hatcher suggests that Socrates was a realist (p.30), that he believed that there were objective standards, accessible to the mind. Such objective standards would provide the means to measure all of our judgements and actions and provide inquirers with "universal" and "objective" criteria to establish the truth of their claims and the rightness of their actions. To call Socrates a realist is, however, anachronistic. Furthermore, Socrates' use of "objective" is not the same as Hatcher’s. For Socrates, the senses are not the reliable means to attain objective knowledge. Socrates argued in the Phaedo that it was by the intellect alone that one gained "objective" knowledge and the objects of the intellect alone are the ideas in themselves and not things. It is also instructive to note that nowhere does Socrates give a clear answer to the question of what these "objective ideas" are or how they are best defined.

Not only must one contend with Socratic idealism, but there are other problems in pressing him into the services that Hatcher would like. While Socrates was neither a realist nor an anti-realist, he certainly recognized that at least one form of ignorance was a lack of understanding concerning the particularity of one's truth claims and practices. In the Apology, Socrates remarked that crafts-persons were more knowledgeable than he when it came to their crafts. If we follow the postmodernist notion of truth as "what is good by way of belief," then Socrates recognized in these persons that, given their aims, they were quite knowledgeable. But, he says that their ignorance is revealed in their act of making claims in other areas of life for which they have not been trained, simply because they are experts within their own domains. What constitutes expert knowledge and ability is context, discipline-specific.

In the Euthyphro, what constituted Euthyphro's basic epistemic flaw? It was his failure to recognize, against his claims to obviousness and universality, that his definition of holiness was context-specific or, particular. To arrive at a better definition of piety, according to Socrates, requires dialogue, since discussion, and not appeal to objective facts, is the only basis for creating a community of interpreters who will find the word useful. What is true of the word "piety" also holds true for words like "truth," "beauty," "justice," and the "good."

Hatcher’s views are, by now, well known and wearing a bit thin. He claims that the University is based upon epistemological realism and anti-realists are destroying its foundations while ruining the minds of students. The obvious truth is that the University, its disciplines, and their methods do not need epistemic justification and most students are neither realist nor anti-realist. In the history of the Western University philosophy might have once sat on the throne vacated by theology, the queen of the sciences. But, today, there are no such monarchies and thrones. Persons in different disciplines are quite capable of establishing their own reasons, methods, and bases for discussion without resorting to metaphysical justifications. In short, we have entered a post-metaphysical era when the philosophers' efforts to claim a distinctive method for establishing or discovering the epistemic foundation of the Academy or our social worlds is simply irrelevant to either domain's activities.

If one needs any evidence to be convinced that realism is in serious danger of falling into the pile of irrelevant Western ideas, I would suggest that they examine the idea of fallibillistic realism. As a member of departments of religion and philosophy, I have often been called upon to teach both religion and philosophy courses. In this capacity, I gave considerable attention to being able to articulate the differences between these disciplines. Philosophy, I urged my students to understand, is unlike religion in that philosophical assertions rely upon persuasion, critical inquiry and discussion, and thoughtful consensus-building. Over the centuries, there have developed tools to help accomplish this aim. Religion, on the other hand, builds communities based upon appeals to sacred authorities and traditions. While certain forms of religion allow for critical discussion, there are always limits imposed on these discussions by these sacred canons. Kai Nielsen once remarked that to continue to hope that philosophers will do in the future what philosophers have never been able to do in the past sounds like "religion conversion."2 I would add that continuing to support realism while, at the same time, claiming that it does not deliver the goods (true and reliable knowledge of an objective reality) sounds like a religious claim of faith or philosophical mythology much more than a useful philosophical idea. Hatcher's attempted defense of realism is predicated on this philosophical mythology, a belief that philosophers must hold to their religious convictions that a final, ultimately true description of things is, in principle, possible. Hatcher, with the humility of a realist with a fallibilist twist, denies that he has this final vocabulary. Even with his humility, is it not Hatcher who assigns students a narrow task of discovering this description? And, again, on what empirical basis are we to accept that this is the legitimate goal of philosophical inquiry? There is no such basis. We possess no such descriptions nor do we know what they would even look like.

If there are no empirical bases for justifying his claims, are there moral reasons, as Hatcher suggests? I think there are moral reasons for rejecting his claims concerning realism and pedagogy. My survey course in philosophy invites students to consider the different vocabularies used by philosophers to describe various things, including themselves. All of these philosophical descriptions cannot be final or right if we mean that they are accurate and true accounts of the way things really are. To suggest to students that a realist epistemology will one day produce those standards by which we might judge these various descriptions is dishonest. My pedagogical strategy is to ask students to assume these philosophical descriptions as they are studied and to determine what things each allows, what they accomplish, and their limitations. Students are then challenged, once having learned several of these vocabularies, to continue this hermeneutical exercise a step further by exploring the incommensurability of these descriptions. I initiate this step not with hope that my students gain an impossible epistemological perspective, but rather with the objective that they develop their own capacities for ironic distance and re-description.

In conclusion, I would ask the reader, "Does this sound like a description of educational bamboozlement or of philosophical education conceived as both therapeutic and edifying?"

Endnotes

1. J. Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, trans. Christian Lenhardt and Shierry Weber Nicholsen (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 1991), p. 3ff.

2. Kai Nielsen, "Philosophy as Critical Theory," Proceedings and Address of the American Philosophical Association, (Newark, DE: APA, 1987), Vol 61, Supp., pp. 89-108.