The Ought-Is Question:

Discovering The Modern In Post-Modernism

David Kenneth Johnson

Introduction

This paper is a comment on the Mark Weinstein-Harvey Siegel debate, culminating in Weinstein's paper "How to Get from Ought to Is: Postmodern Epistemology and Social Justice."1 I will not rehearse here the details of a discussion that at times simply speaks to shared (mostly political and pedagogic) assumptions; rather, I will address one topic which both authors agree rests at the heart of their dispute: the relation of statements of fact ("is-statements") to statements of value ("ought-statements"). Most generally, we can say that Weinstein claims, against a tradition that begins with the philosopher David Hume, that one can (in some sense soon to be specified) get from ought to is (and, presumably, from is to ought), while Siegel claims, with the tradition, that one cannot.

I maintain that everything hinges on the proper interpretation of the term "get," without which the debate threatens to evaporate. In section 1 I identify that interpretation as a deductive one. Section 2 lists seven of Weinstein's most recent attempts to get from ought to is. I suggest that (in at least 5 of the seven attempts) Weinstein wavers between the proper, deductive interpretation of the term "get" and a more commonplace, nondeductive sense, each time threatening either to undermine his postmodern assumptions or, in the latter case, dissolve any disagreement between himself and his modernist critics. In Section 3 I raise and then respond to three possible objections to my negative view of Weinstein's position. This last section offers a general (though brief) discussion of the viability of the postmodern project if construed as a radical break with modernist principles of evidence, rationality, and truth.

1. The Is-Ought (Ought-Is) Question

According to tradition, to "get from is to ought" (and, presumably, from ought to is) means to deduce an ought-conclusion from exclusively is-premises. Let us use getD to indicate this standard (deductive) interpretation. It is a relatively simple matter to show that any substantive is-ought (or ought-is) controversy must limit itself to this interpretation. Consider the effects of loosening the connection from strict entailment (that is, getD) to any type of nondeductive inference or explanation:

(1) One should avoid hitting others because hitting is potentially dangerous.

No one denies that statements of fact and value are often combined or associated, as one serves as evidence for, explains, or determines (in some nonreductive sense2) the other. (1) is a perfectly sensible assertion, where the projection of possibly harmful consequences of certain acts serves as a reason for concluding that those acts ought to be avoided. That is, we can getND (in some nondeductive sense) to that conclusion. But, construed as a deductive inference, the is-ought problem is obvious:

(2) Hitting is potentially dangerous (an is-statement).

(3) Therefore, one should avoid hitting others (an ought-statement).

Now (3) follows from (2) only given (at least) the additional evaluative premise (2'): One should avoid doing things that are potentially dangerous. That is, one cannot without some further premise getD from (2) to (3). The logic is the same, though more obvious still, if we reverse the movement from ought to is: The moral imperative "one should avoid hitting others," though clearly dependent for its meaningfulness on some understanding of factual matters, does not entail that hitting is potentially dangerous (or any other purely factual claim). In our present case (paraphrasing Siegel's depiction of Weinstein's thinking) we have:

(4) Dialogue ought to be conducted in conditions of full access and equal respect (an "ought-statement").

(5) Therefore, agreements and conclusions reached in dialogue not conducted in conditions of full access and equal respect are less likely to be true (an "is-statement") (GO, p. 18).

This, too, fails as a deduction, since we cannot getD from (4) to (5) without the assistance of (at least) one further premise acting to link the evaluative element of (4) with the factual results outlined in (5).3 Of course, the results will be the same for all "postmodern" attempts to getD from ought to is; while efforts simply to getND from ought to is are not a source of controversy for either Siegel or Weinstein.

2. Weinstein on Getting from Ought to Is

The following, listed in order of their appearance in Weinstein (HG), are seven attempts to get from ought to is. All emphases are mine. I follow each quotation with a translation designed to highlight its essential contribution to the ought-is debate.

(1) "[The] confrontation with social injustice yields the essential epistemological probe for revealing the deep delusions of [modernism]..." (HG, p. 26).

Translation: Statements of value ("confrontation[s] with social injustice") can yield (produce, lead to) statements of fact (statements concerning "the deep delusions of [modernist epistemology]").

(2) "[E]thical norms of justification [play] a role heretofore reserved for the purely epistemological" (HG, p. 28).

Translation: At times, the moral status (or ethical justification) of a proposition (or act) will determine its truth value (or epistemic worthiness generally).

(3) "[E]pistemological failings are often and importantly the result of moral failings" (HG, p. 28).

I assume that to say A yields B is equivalent to saying B is the result of A. So our translation is similar to case (2) (The moral status of a proposition (or act) can have a causal influence on its truth value (or epistemic worthiness generally)), but identical to case (1): Statements of value can yield statements of fact.

(4) "[T]he disenfranchisement and marginalization of obviously available points of view from which blatant injustice results is an indicator of the depth of failure of the epistemological principles as used" (HG, p. 28).

Translation: Injustice can result from the apparent misapplication of epistemological principles.

(5) "[C]onsiderations of social justice [can/should] be taken as yielding epistemological assessments" (HG, p. 30).

Translation (as with cases (1) and (3)): Statements of value can yield statements of fact.

(6) "[Postmodernism asserts the] usefulness of particular ought questions in determining epistemological merit" (HG, p. 30).

Translation (as with case (2)): At times, the moral status of a proposition (or act) will determine its truth value (or epistemic worthiness generally).

(7) "[A]wareness of social justice issues [can] impac[t] on purely epistemological theories " (HG, p. 31).

Translation (as with case (4)): Injustice can result from the apparent misapplication of epistemological principles.

The seven cases reveal only two sets of (marginally) unique candidates for the logical connection getD : [(1), (3), (5)] and [(2), (6)], where the members of each set appear to be roughly equivalent in meaning. Cases (4) and (7), which also appear to be equivalent in meaning, are obvious instances of getND. With respect to these last two, modernism sanctions (even demands) the recognition that injustice may, and often does, result from the misapplication of epistemological principles. Siegel's answer to Weinstein speaks to these two cases:

So the project of improving our inevitably defective principles and practices -- in part, by listening to and respecting the "intuitions of justice" of the marginalized and oppressed -- is a never-ending one, which we embark upon because of our valuing of truth and justice. Here again, our embrace of these values, and our recognition of a thorough-going fallibilism with respect to our own beliefs, values, principles, and practices -- without all of which the Postmodernist project makes no sense -- is remarkably Modernist (GO, p. 20).

We need only consider the two remaining unique sets of cases (let us label them (a) and (b). They are (as in [(1), (3), (5)]):

(a) Statements of value can yield statements of fact;

and (as in [(2), (6]):

(b) At times, the moral status (or ethical justification) of a proposition (or act) will determine its truth value (or epistemic worthiness generally).

The meaning of the term "yield" in (a) is ambiguous between non-logical expressions such as "produce," "lead to," and so on, and the logical notion "entail." If the intended meaning is one of the former expressions, then all instances of case (a) become instances of getND which, as previously noted, the modernist is happy to endorse. As an example, recall case (3) above, where the moral status of a proposition (or act) is said to have a possible causal influence on its truth value (or epistemic worthiness generally). Such cases confirm our suspicion that exclusionary discourse frames or practices often lead to (yield, produce, etc.) poor results; or, in the prosaic language of the debate, corrupted reason may not yield the true (see RH, p. 21, GO, p. 21, and HG, p. 26). If, on the other hand, the intended meaning of the term "yield" is "entail," then each instance of case (a) will suffer all of the problems of gettingD from an ought to an is outlined above.

The situation is similar for both instances of (b). Here the term "determine" is ambiguous in the same fashion, leaving us to decide whether Weinstein means to imply only that, as in our non-logical interpretation of instances of (a), exclusion can (or may) lead away from truth (and is, therefore, an unobjectionable thesis), or that exclusion entails error. But if exclusion entails error, then the mere existence of exclusion is sufficient to say, with certainty, that some error exists as well. But this is clearly false, since exclusionary practices may produce truths, just as inclusion may produce untruths.

3. Three Objections

In this final section I state and then respond to three hypothetical objections to my characterization of the debate.

Objection #1: This is a caricature of the postmodern position on the ought-is connection. No one can, as you say, getD from an ought to an is, since that relation is by definition a necessary one. We only hold that there exists a contingent relation between statements of value and statements of fact, such that, on occasion, moral failings are good indicators of epistemological merit.

Response: This is not so much an objection as it is simply another instance of case (4) above, which outlines a non-deductive, perfectly acceptable way (to "old-fashioned," modernist epistemologists) to getND from ought to is. Furthermore, if, as this objection implies, instances of case (4) exhaust the postmodern perspective on this issue, then there is, as Siegel puts it, "rather less to the Postmodern criticism of the Enlightenment than meets the eye" (GO, p. 20).

Objection #2: Your analysis exhibits a preference for the Platonic (abstract, Western, oppressive) notions of "necessity and sufficiency" over the more contextual, pragmatic language of postmodern discourse. Our commitment to fallibilism, to multiple perspectives, truths, and realities, "requires that all [such] principles be afforded careful scrutiny" (HG, p. 30).

Objection #3: Perhaps I must accept the "logical independence of ought and is" (HG, p. 30). Even so, I am not convinced that some sort of useful connection doesn't exists between the two. For, given that our primary task ought to be to address the real suffering of the victims of exclusionary practices (to change, and not merely interpret, the world, as Marx would have it), we shouldn't allow the abstractions of analytic philosophy to deter our efforts.

Response: This final objection simply affirms the truth of my case against gettingD from ought to is. It then proceeds to confound (in the name of Marx) the logical independence of is and ought with a claim (which I have denied) about their independence generally. To repeat: A rejection of Weinstein's position on the ought-is connection is perfectly consistent with the claim that "some sort of useful connection" often exists between statements of fact and statements of value. Indeed, stripped of its postmodern excesses, I am inclined to accept (with Siegel) the main outlines of Weinstein's critique of "totalizing" and exclusionary frameworks. Even so, Weinstein's position on the relation of ought to is exhibits this contradictory impulse: He both denies, in each attempt to getD from ought to is, the logical independence of the two types of claims, and (at other times) seems to find their logical independence unobjectionable yet unimportant (HG, p. 30). In order to avoid contradiction, he must either acknowledge the modernist roots of postmodernism or attempt a futile break with modernism's most pervasive assumptions. Either way, or so I have argued, Weinstein will not have shown us how to getD from ought to is.5

Endnotes

1 I limit all references to the debate to the following papers: Mark Weinstein, (1993), "Rationalist Hopes and Utopian Visions" (RH), Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines, 11, 3; Harvey Siegel, (1993), "Gimme That Old-Time Enlightenment Meta-Narrative: Radical Pedagogies (And Politics) Require Old-Fashioned Epistemology (And Moral Theory)" (GO), Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines, 11, 4; and Mark Weinstein, (1994), How to Get from Ought to Is: Postmodern Epistemology and Social Justice" (HG), Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines, 13, 3&4.

2 We can say that A nonreductively determines B if and only if A determines B and B is not reducible or equivalent to A and A does not entail B. For a challenging discussion of the nonreductive factual determination of values see John F. Post, (1987), The Faces of Existence: An Essay in Nonreductive Metaphysics, London: Cornell University Press.

3 What might that premise look like? Since the form of the this argument is A, therefore B (or (4), therefore, (5)), we may construe the argument as an enthymeme with the implicit premise if A then B or if dialogue ought to be conducted in conditions of full access and equal respect then agreements and conclusions reached in dialogue not conducted in conditions of full access and equal respect are less likely to be true.

4 I discuss the constructivist roots of postmodernism in my (1993) "The Metaphysics of Constructivism," Cybernetics and Human Knowing, 1, 4 (Denmark).

5 Thanks to Kathleen R. Johnson and Matt Silliman for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.