The Delimitation of Argument

Michael A. Gilbert

The term 'argument' lies, naturally enough, at the heart of Argumentation Theory, but that in itself does not mean that there is any consensus as to the correct meaning or use of the term. While the field is now sufficiently mature to involve several journals, various conferences, and numerous academics from diverse disciplines, a univocal and general definition of the key term has not surfaced. Prejudices from the different perspectives of each contributory discipline as well as academic disagreements within disciplines means that the term is frequently co-opted and fought over. Nonetheless, most definitions offered by argumentation theorists, whether Informal Logicians, Communication Theorists, or something betwixt and between, fall into one of two camps. Five definitions which neatly fall into one of these two camps will be examined. In addition, a sixth definition will be presented based primarily on ordinary usage but also incorporating the approach found in the Communication Theory sub-area of Discourse Analysis.

The essential issue faced here is the delimitation of the concept 'argument.' The question may be phrased as follows. What sorts of communicative interactions are to be considered as arguments, and which not? The answer to this question determines what argumentation scholars should study and what they can ignore. This is especially important because many scholars use argument as an honourific that indicates a certain minimal level of intellectual activity beneath which a communicator need not be heeded. As a result, the designation of a particular type of activity as non-argument means that the messages contained therein may be ignored or, at least, dealt with in a less respectful way than "real argumentation." The aim of this essay is to argue for a broad definition of the term 'argument.'

There are many terms that can be applied to dialogic communications that subdivide the generic category of 'argument.' Walton offers a taxonomy that covers a wide range of categories. Unfortunately, only a small subset of these categories is considered by most researchers as worthy of the attention of critical reasoning researchers. Moreover, the assumption in such a taxonomy is that the categories are separable and that, for example, a "quarrel" can be distinguished from a "critical discussion." This leads to a ranking relying first on explicitness and, secondly, on logico-critical content. Invariably, the naturalistic argument must be stripped and refined in order that the "underlying argument" be exposed. In other words, for the members of the first view, the "real argument" is something that is ideally presented in a clear and linear fashion, and at worst must be extricated from the mare's nest of emotional and psychological debris in which it is found.

The first camp accounts for the first three of the six definitions to be listed below and is represented by the Informal Logicians Ralph Johnson and Tony Blair, and Trudy Govier. Also sharing this perspective is the Dutch School of Pragma-Dialectics led by Frans van Eemeren, Rob Grootendorst and Track Kruiger. The definitions offered by these scholars narrow the notion of argumentation to a procedure that is precise and contained. Its proponents tend to rule the waves on the sea of critical reasoning textbooks and informal logic courses as currently found in most universities. The approach appeals to rules and procedures, relies heavily on the analysis of components, and invariably winnows arguments down from complex, sometimes heated exchanges to sets of premises, conclusions, moves and counter-moves. Indeed, this refining of arguments from rough and tumble discourse to their distilled logico-rational essence is the raison d'être of this approach. I will refer to the definitions offered by this group as the Conservative View.

The second perspective, represented here by Charles Willard and Michael Gilbert, sees argument as not necessarily so well-structured. Rather it is a loose, sometimes anything goes, communicative dynamic, the main focus of which is the notion of disagreement. Arguments, on this view, are not identified by how one goes about having them, but by what causes or impels them. As a result, there may be a dearth of analytical tools available for argument investigation insofar as arguments, as opposed to one aspect of them, cannot really be standardized. This approach will be called the Liberal View.

A last definition, not yet classified, is due to Scott Jacobs and Sally Jackson and represents the approach taken in Discourse Analysis, a subspecies of Communication Theory. It is closest to the Liberal, but also has ties to the Ordinary view which will be brought forward shortly. To outrageously capsulize, then, the Conservative view holds that 'argument' refers to a form of communication that involves several precise intellectual steps, while the Liberal view maintains that 'argument' refers generally to situations in which different opinions are allegedly or actually in contest. The six definitions will now be presented, and the Ordinary view will then be discussed.

I. Johnson and Blair: Argument is a dialectical process involving the presentation of a position involving the offering and answering of questions relevant to the acceptance of a proposition (op. cit., pp. 4546).

II. Govier: "An...argument is...a piece of discourse or writing in which someone tries to convince others (or himself) of the truth of a claim by citing reasons on its behalf" (op. cit., p. 4).

III. van Eemeren, Grootendorst and Kruiger: "Argumentation is a social, intellectual, verbal activity serving to justify or refute an opinion, consisting of a constellation of statements and directed towards obtaining the approbation of an audience" (op. cit., p. 7).

IV. Willard: "Argument is a form of interaction in which two or more people maintain what they construe to be incompatible positions" (op. cit., p. 1).

V. Gilbert: "An argument is any disagreement-from the most polite discussion to the loudest brawl" (op. cit., p. 3).

VI. Jacobs & Jackson: "arguments are disagreement relevant speech events" based on a disruption in the desired response in a conversation (op. cit., p. 254).

Definitions I-III stress the ideas of logico-rational acceptance, reasons, and being convinced, while definitions IV and V focus on the fact of disagreement as opposed to how the disagreement proceeds. VI also has as its essence the notion that something has happened, namely disagreement, that requires repair. It is this last aspect, the idea that the presence of argument involves something that needs fixing, that precludes VI's simple inclusion into the Liberal view, and, instead, places it in the about-to-be introduced Ordinary view. Still, at this point, it can readily be seen that the Conservative view will cover far fewer instances of dialogical (and monological) discourse than the Liberal view. The Conservatives must inspect a disagreement to see how it proceeds before deeming it an argument, whereas the Liberals simply require the presence of real (or imagined) disagreement.

These categories cover a wide range of definitions offered by scholars (there are many more that fall in between), but none of them captures the ordinary language sense of the term, though VI comes close. I-III use 'argument' as an honourific; the term is applied to a process that is characterized by reason, creative interaction, thoughtfulness, and is explicitly verbal (or at worst straightforwardly verbalisable.) IV and V cover many more situations, but also fail to capture the generally negative association most ordinary language users apply to the English term 'argument.' When surveying ordinary people as to what they think about argument, about 15% of respondents will state, "I love to argue." This is usually uttered with a predatory glint and an ever so slightly manic smile. Another 15% will look vaguely horrified and fearful, and will say something like, "Oh, I never argue." But the majority will pull a face, then explain that they do not like to argue. If pursued, the interlocutor will be told that the individual questioned likes discussions, but not arguments. Indeed, on the Ordinary view, they are not usually the sort of thing one enjoys.1

The reason for this attitude is that most language users, i.e., people, associate the term 'argument' with a negative conflictual experience charged with emotion. Arguments are often considered to be unfortunate, albeit unavoidable, interactions. Even in those situations where argument is to be expected, e.g., meetings and intimate relationships, it is frequently viewed with trepidation and distaste. Argument theorists, (myself included) believe in the logical, critical and emotional value of dispute, and often have to defend argument and explain why it is a benevolent, vital and sometimes enjoyable component of human interaction and communication. Doing this involves explaining that one does not have to use argument to just mean a fight. Nonetheless, most respondents do view the term 'argue' negatively, and talking about a "good argument" of the sort so beloved by academics is considered at worst an oxymoron, and at best an unusual occurrence. (The general public reserves the term 'discussion' for dissensual interactions it does not find negative.) This negative attitude toward argument can be underscored by presenting several familiar expressions:

"I don't want to argue about it."

"If all you want to do is argue, then..."

"Why do we always end up arguing?"

"You always argue with everything I say."

"Let's not argue."

The familiarity of these turns of phrase shows that many people are argument avoiders, though not discussion avoiders. For these people, even the expression, "That was a good argument," may indicate surprise and relief as opposed to the feeling of having had a good workout that, say, an academic might intend. Another example of the pervasiveness of this attitude can be found in a grade school teacher's lesson book. In this book, which is concerned with providing lessons for teachers instructing in basic social and life skills, an argument is bad while a discussion is good. There are line drawings showing that children "arguing" are cross and angry, while children "discussing" are pleasant and mild-mannered. This attitude is expressed in definition VII, the Ordinary view.

VII. Ordinary Usage: An argument is a generally negative conflictual experience charged with emotion where conflicting beliefs, desires and/or attitudes are involved.

The core terms here are 'negative' and 'conflict', both of which denote situations most people would prefer to avoid. The argument need not follow any particular pattern; it could be a shouting match or a lovers' quarrel provided only that there is dissension with regard to something one of the partners feels, believes or wants. Two partners, on the other hand, (business or marital), sitting down to calmly work out their differences or make a difficult decision on which they do not see eye-to-eye would not be described as "arguing" unless the "discussion" got out of hand. In that instance the discussion might be said to degenerate into an argument. Definition VI could be connected to the Liberal view, since it views argument as essentially motivated by disagreement rather than identified by its processes. However, also at its core is the idea that argument is a disruption in an otherwise smooth flowing interaction, and so, it is closer to the Ordinary view.

The relation between definitions I-III, viz., the Conservative view, and definition VII is instructive because there is a definite intersection between them. There are arguments that fall under the umbrella of the Ordinary usage that are Conservative arguments and those that are not. That is, to the Conservatives, the interaction in question qualifies as an argument if, regardless of the level of emotion, physicality and empathy, it meets the minimal requirements of being reasoned, dialectic and focused.2 I do not mean to suggest that the Conservatives outlaw the less cerebral aspects of communication, but rather that they do not see any of them as necessary or even vital concomitants of argumentation. To the contrary, the rôle such aspects of communication play is potentially harmful to good argumentation. Some Conservatives would put a limit on the amount or degree of emotion, etc. present in the interchange such that, exceeding that limit means the interchange is not an argument but something else, such as a squabble or quarrel. Still, many instances of argumentation that are Ordinary acceptable would also be Conservative acceptable. For the Conservatives, it is not necessary to be arguing without any emotion or excitement, just that those aspects must be under control and not the overriding force of the encounter.

The Liberal's definition, on the other hand, does cover all instances of Ordinary argument, but then also goes on to include many more types of interaction that might not be called arguments on the Ordinary view. In particular, the Liberal view includes all the Conservative instances rejected by the Ordinary view on the grounds that they are not at all emotionally charged. The Liberals, like the Conservatives, do not require emotion, but unlike the Conservatives, also do not deem as necessary any form of logico-rational processes. According to both the Conservative and Liberal views, arguments can have a non-dispassionate nature where the purpose is inquiry and the persons involved remain calm, emotionally disinterested, and use (for all practical purposes) exclusively careful, linear, logical, step-by-step reasoning. We will refer to non-emotional argumentative exchanges of this nature as clinical arguments. This is preferable to, say, 'rational', as it avoids the suggestion that emotional exchanges are, ipso facto, non-rational. Using this terminology, we can now state that, in Ordinary parlance, clinical dialogic arguments are often called 'discussions.' They are viewed as interesting, perhaps challenging, even worthwhile and intellectually stimulating, but are not considered 'arguments.' It is, of course, fascinating that a term considered by the Conservatives to be an honourific is considered by the Ordinary view to be a derogative.

For the Conservatives the Holy Grail is dialectic-that interactive endeavour pursued by Socrates and exemplified in the Platonic Dialogues. As an ideal, it is careful, disinterested, dedicated to the search for truth, and devoid of ego involvement and intentional misdirection. Dialectic is the paragon of argumentation, the way it should be conducted if we are to truly better ourselves and remain above the quagmire from which we evolved. Dialectic, and its monological correlate, are what should be included under the rubric 'argument.' Unstructured exchanges not proceeding in an orderly manner that involve the presentation and questioning of a position and its objections are eschewed by the Conservatives because the position on which the exchange is focused may not be articulated or even articulable. That is, the premises and conclusion may not be easily or practically identifiable. For the Liberal and the Ordinary user, the plaint, "We argue all the time, but I never know what we're arguing about," requires no correction. The Conservative, on the other hand, would require a change to some such term as 'fight', 'row' or 'quarrel.' If you do not know what you are arguing about, then you are not arguing; you are doing something else. To argue just means to have a conclusion and premises that form a position that can be identified, questioned, attacked and defended.

The arguments eschewed by the Conservatives do not have these parts, or, at least, not all of them. Worse yet, all the parts might be there, but no one is paying any attention to them. The partners to the dispute are too caught up in their emotions, egos, feelings or what have you to listen to the statements being put forward and notice how they impact on their own position. Such arguments will hereafter be called chaotic, and they are to be thought of as opposed to dialectical arguments. Note that a "chaotic argument" is not one that has no structure, but rather one where the statements and responses made by the disputants do not necessarily relate to each other, and where there is not usually reasonably careful attention to question and answer. In a chaotic argument it can be very difficult to determine just who is defending what, and the participants themselves may be a) unclear about what the issue is, and b) wrong as to their dispute partner's position on the issue. Both parties will agree that there is some disagreement, but it might as easily be of attitude or feeling as of belief.

There are now two measures that can be applied to various interactions that enable us to see how the three uses of the term 'argument' are applied. The first measure is the emotional-clinical continuum, and the second is the dialectical-chaotic continuum. In the following, in order to avoid pre-judgment, the generic term 'dispute' will be used to cover the broadest possible sense of the term 'argument.' Which disputes are arguments depends on which view/usage one holds, and may be represented by the following chart.

Several points arising from this chart are worth noting. The first is that no group believes that emotion precludes argument. While only Ordinary users make emotion a necessary condition of argument, both Liberals and Conservatives still expect it to commonly be present. Johnson and Blair specifically set aside the emotion vs. reason dichotomy (1983, 171), and Govier seems concerned with the quantity of emotive language rather than its simple presence (op. cit., p.121,122). This is not to say that there is no connection between emotionality and chaos. I believe most of us would agree that as emotional pitch tends to rise, so does the likelihood of chaos, though not in any necessary correlation.

Of course, none of this need be a problem for Argumentation Theory. It would be the simplest thing to create a nomenclature that would respect all three terminologies. In other words, we could define away the problem by designating different terms for different activities. 'Dispute,' for example, might be used to cover the Liberals' interpretation and include anything anyone might loosely consider to be an argument. 'Formal dialectic' could be assigned to the Conservatives to designate arguments that are sufficiently dialectical, and 'quarrel' could be assigned to those arguments normally identified by the term 'argument' in Ordinary usage. Notwithstanding that the terms suggested overlap in egregious ways, this Solomonic path of no resistance still leaves one major question unanswered. What is it that Argumentation Theory, that new but not-quite-officially-adopted and very interdisciplinary branch of philosophy, should study? And, for that matter, what sorts of arguments should philosophers, argumentation theorists or not, consider, respect, study and teach? The Ordinary usage will not do: it utilizes emotional conflict in an inappropriate way insofar as it requires that disputes be emotional before they qualify as arguments. Certainly, Argumentation Theory will not exclude clinical and dialectical arguments. Whether they are put forward as paradigms or not, they are, at the very least, important sorts of arguments for those who appreciate their beauty and nuance. Argumentation theory cannot want to separate emotional from clinical arguments for the purpose of determining the field's domain of study. No philosopher believes that all arguments are, can be, or should be, devoid of emotion, but Ordinary usage insofar as it requires a minimal emotional and conflictual component in disputes is unsuitable as a definition.

The Conservative approach, however, suffers from exactly the opposite extreme. There seems to be just too many dialogic interchanges which most people label as argumentative to ignore the discrepancy. The difficulty stems from the Conservatives' admiration of logico-rationality, usually just called 'reason' and invariably put forward as the mode of communication most appropriate for settling differences of opinion. Unfortunately, this neglects the fact that human beings communicate on many different levels, not just the verbal and intellectual. Other modes of reasoning are available and utilized regularly in practically every conceivable circumstance and most certainly in argumentation (Gilbert, 1994).

It is no accident that the Conservative and Ordinary senses of 'argument' have one crucial aspect in common. They both use 'argument' normatively. The Ordinary view's connotation of the term is negative, and indicates an unpleasant situation that, at the least, could be handled better. For the Conservatives, however, the connotation is positive and allows that the situation might have been handled in the best possible way. At the very least, the parties put forward claims and reasons in their support and examined each other's sub-arguments with a logico-rational critical eye. On this account, according to the Conservatives, the interaction that begins with, "You left the car out of gas again this morning," and ends with mutual recriminations is just not an argument. It is simply not about the subject that the words in the argument make it sound like it is about. There may even be agreement that the implicit position in the above may be construed as, "You ought not leave the car without gas." But, for the Conservative, what is important about the counter, "Big deal, you forgot to put the garbage out," is that it can be interpreted as an instance of the tu quoque fallacy. The rejoinder, in other words, is strictly viewed as responding to claim, warrant or backing rather than as one person responding to another in a particular situation. If the next round is even "worse", e.g., "Oh, yeah, well then the heck with you," then we are most definitely not arguing.

Most observers, certainly Ordinary and Liberal, would agree that there certainly is the beginning of an argument, dialectical or otherwise commencing in the above example. But the Conservative cannot allow this. Allowing it means the denial of the supremacy of language in the pantheon of communication. It means that the linguistically explicit is not always the first and last appeal, i.e., arguments cannot be won only because of what someone said. And this is the very heart of the Conservative position: what makes it conservative is that it only permits as argumentatively significant those processes which are observable, identifiable, and which follow certain rules and procedures. To do otherwise is just to do something other than argue.

No Conservative actually maintains that every part of an argument must be linguistically explicit. Enthymemes are taken for granted as the normal way to communicate, but note that almost all the techniques for determining the enthymematic elements rest on the assumption that there is a quasi-linguistic element that can somehow be uncovered. It is as if the very proposition is hiding in some Gricean mind and can be levered out with a modus ponens. The Conservative does not require the linguistically explicit, but the linguistically explicable, to use D.J. O'keefe's terminology. The dispute must be capable of being put into language. Why? Because if there is no requirement for linguistic explicability, then we do not know what we are talking about when we dispute, and ipso facto, it is not argument. There is no way out of this for the Conservative view.

There are two difficulties with this position. The first difficulty is that the indeterminacy of translation applies to digging out enthymemes as much as anything else. Arguments do not even have to be enthymematic to create problems with interpretation or comprehension. Just consider the controversies that have arisen over the way in which one scholar portrays the work of another. Professor Smith writes a 500 page book, and Professor Jones first summarizes it in several paragraphs and then proceeds to attack it. Professor Smith, as everyone expects, explains that Professor Jones completely misunderstood him. The simple fact is that, regardless of the level of explicitness and certainly allowing for questions of degree, written and verbal arguments are always open to various interpretations. When the situation is, as it normally is, not linguistically explicit, then we must interpret and draw on non-verbal aspects of a message in order to understand it. The point is not that we cannot understand each other, but that, amazingly enough, we do. We do communicate with a remarkable degree of comprehension; but comprehension must not be confused with precision. Precision comes from the interaction of communicators working together to understand, not from the simple presence of linguistic elements or the sole reliance on logico-rational techniques.

The second difficulty is this. Understanding another person's point of view requires more than getting right the meanings of the words being used. Words, most especially when used in dialogic situations, do not give the entire message, but only part of it. The remainder, which may vary from a small percentage to practically the entire communication, is embedded in the context, tonality, history and personalities of the arguers. Without all this, with words alone, we do not have sufficient information to disambiguate the simplest message, let alone a complex argument. To cite a simple example, consider the statement made by Jill when she looks out at the snowstorm upon arising in the morning. Seeing that the street is completely buried she says, "Great, I can't get to work today." This can mean either that she is happy she has a day off or that she is upset that she cannot get into the office. Her husband, Jack, standing beside her will in all likelihood know which she means-even if her voice was flat. Language only carries part of meaning.

The above considerations are certainly not revolutionary, but they seem not to have permeated the Conservative approach to argumentation. For them, the words are everything and the rest is winnowed, eliminated and discarded. But this simply will not work. In order to understand a particular argumentation we must bring to it considerable information not presented in the actual words. Simply put, the choices are to give up the assumption that we know things at all, or allow that we know things without the exclusive use of language. This is because we do know what people mean when they say things, and we must admit that the knowledge of that meaning does not come exclusively from understanding the language of the message. Ergo, it comes from other modes of communication.

The Ordinary view is also incapable of performing as a standard definition for two simple reasons. First of all, it excludes too many arguments both the Conservatives and Liberals want included and that have been included for millennia. Secondly, the Ordinary view allows that there are such things as "good arguments," "interesting arguments," and so on. This means that all those communicative events are, ipso facto, arguments, just as spicy food is, ipso facto, food. Consequently, the Ordinary view will be taken into consideration, but will not be adopted as nomenclature appropriate for delimiting Argumentation Theory.

The most basic difference between the Conservative and Ordinary views as compared to the Liberal view, is the latter's lack of normativity.3 For the first two views the most important consideration is that argument is considered in a certain light, positive for the former and negative for the latter. The Liberal approach is not to judge the argument, but to understand the position it represents, not to set out rules and procedures, but to discover rules and procedures. In order to do this, argumentation must first be observed as a process, and the emphasis must be shifted from the argument to the arguer. When this is done we can examine the process as an attempt to attain certain goals or accomplish certain ends, and then we can inspect this process from various perspectives including the logical, psychological, sociological and moral. One important difference is that we are then in a position to isolate the perspective most germane to the particular proceedings, rather than apply one set of criteria across the board.

The other advantage to the Liberal view is that it does not limit argumentative moves. Anything can happen in an argument and still be considered part of it. Views such as this have been propounded by Brockriede and Willard. Brockriede says, "people will find arguments in the vicinity of people." Willard goes further:

I prefer to avoid a priori requirements for the utterance to be found in arguments except that arguers, like all communicators, employ the full range of available communication modalities, verbal and nonverbal, explicit and implicit. The theory defended here thus defines argument in terms of encounters based on dissensus and regards any communications occurring therein as objects of epistemic and critical interest. (1989, op. cit., p. 8.)

In other words, argument is where you find it and as you find it.

When there is disagreement, people will engage in many diverse activities designed variously to persuade, win, investigate, placate, convince, intimidate, or whatever is called for by the particular dissensual context. The mistake is not in investigating one of these techniques. The mistake lies in attempting to limit the notion of argument to only one of these several possible avenues. It is not that the logico-rational approach to Argumentation Theory is wrong as much as that it is not the only approach.

The Liberal view, as every good liberal view should be, is inclusive. It does not preclude any particular approach or discipline from having important input into Argumentation Theory. Since it begins with observation rather than instruction, it must be open to any sort of analysis that might shed light on the process. The subject of investigation is the determination of exactly what goes on in an argument, not what should go on in an argument. As a result, and as most participants in arguments know, a wide range of human activity is covered. And, the use of the term 'human' here is not accidental. The Conservative view, with its emphasis on a logico-rational model works by eliminating what the model cannot handle. If the input is not intelligible to the processor, then it is eschewed. But forsaking one model in favour of a multiplicity means that anything that actually occurs in an argument (broadly considered) can be analyzed, itemized, dissected and judged. It is the embrasure of the human-ness of argumentation that makes the Liberal view so attractive. At one and the same time it is accepting and analytical. It accepts whatever occurs as just that-an argumentative occurrence, while in no way precluding analysis and judgment, provided only that said normative elements are clearly and openly demarcated and (ideally) defended.

There is a further advantage to the Liberal position, viz., it is much more amenable to alternative modes of reasoning. There are those who claim that the traditional logico-rational approach is culture and or gender specific. Grice, for example, lays out a set of rules which are clearly derived from a relatively narrow Anglo-Saxon tradition. In some cultures, for example, saying only the minimum is both the exception and a sign of potentially rude taciturnity. In others, the exact opposite is true. Consequently, due to these and other considerations, certain fallacies such as emotive language, equivocation, ad hominem and ad misericordiam (to mention a few) might be applied according to totally different precepts. One of Grice's basic rules, for example, is the rule of Quality which stipulates that one ought always tell the truth. In many cultures (including, arguably his own,) this rule simply does not apply in many situations. Insulting one's host by not praising the food, drink or accommodations is often considered a far greater fault than equivocating or, even, outright lying.

In this same vein should be considered arguments brought by some feminist scholars. Warren, Moulton and Nye all argue that the standard modes of argumentation and logic in contemporary philosophy are systems developed by, and which benefit, men. The logico-rational system taught almost universally in the English Western world as the correct way to reason and conduct argumentation, they claim, greatly favours the many males whose social and psychological inculcation is more inclined to such a linear modality.4 Whether accepted or not, these arguments cannot be met by the Conservatives whose rules and procedures precede practice. The Liberal, on the other hand, can have no objection to investigating an approach or technique that is not prevalent. There is nothing in prevalence that makes an argumentative move better or worse.

The Liberal view, unlike the Conservative does not eschew the category of chaotic-emotional arguments. This is taken to be a benefit as relatively few arguments seem to lack one or both of these characteristics. On the contrary, if one is to seriously consider the level of chaos and emotion in most of the arguments one comes across on a routine basis, far more would fall into this category than any other. What advantage is there to philosophy to exclude the chaotic and/or the emotional from the court of argumentation? Emotion is as important as logic or rationality to argument, and it is also inextricable from the logic of the argument. There is not some visible delineation between logic and emotion (or intuition or anything else) that allows the scholar to examine one to the exclusion of the other. Consider what it means to persuade someone of a proposition P. First, it must be embraced by them as part of their belief set-and not merely intellectually. Believing on the rational level alone is not sufficient for persuasion. In order for someone to be persuaded of a proposition P, that person must change not only his/her belief states but the corresponding attitudes as well. Someone whose mind has been convinced but does not fully believe is liable to say something like, "I guess you're right, but I'm still having trouble with it." One can begin with either the mind or the body, but persuasion does not occur until both are synchronized.

It is simply wrong for philosophers to ignore the emotional, physical, and intuitional aspects of belief, persuasion and argumentation. The myth of the rational is not just its elevation to the pinnacle of philosophical importance, but the very idea that it is at all separable from the non-rational in the first place. In studiously avoiding the chaotic-emotive category of argument, Informal Logic isolates itself from its constituency. The very premise of contemporary critical reasoning is that everything must be defended, justified and explicated without recourse to situational or contextual or personal information. The ideology is that an argument is an artifact, a thing that can be examined, categorized and judged in isolation from its surroundings like a shell found on the beach. But even then, to understand the nature of the shell its point of discovery must be known. Is it saltwater or fresh? Sandy beach or rocky? The point for Informal Logic should not be to improve the reasoning of those who will follow the rules, but rather to find the rules of those whose reasoning needs improving.

Studying an argument is like studying anything else. It is attached and connected to its surroundings in an irrevocable way. There are significant aspects of language, usage and style that are beyond the comprehension of anyone not familiar with the particular history of those involved. But this does not mean that the analysis of arguments from a multitude of perspectives is a worthless endeavour. Not at all. It is rather that the categories must be extended to include errors, forms, and categories that go beyond the logico-rational and include, systematically, all the modalities of human communication.

Philosophers should not label emotive reasoning, physical actions, and even intuitional communication as not 'argument.' To do so is to write it off as something less than worthy of attention, or, at the least, less ennobling and less important. Certainly this should not be done without, by the Conservative View's own lights, a very serious argument.

Endnotes

1 While concrete documentation does not exist for these figures, they are based on twenty years of experience responding to reactions from students and clients of all ages, occupations and backgrounds.

2 I do not, of course, mean physicality in the sense of violence, but in the sense of using one's body and surroundings.

3 This is not to say that there are theories without normative aspects, but rather that the Conservative and Ordinary views have a much higher normative component than the Liberal.

4 Self-identifying reference omitted.

Citations

Barth, Else M. & Krabbe, Eric C.W. 1982. From Axiom to Dialogue. Berlin: de Gruyter.

Brockriede, Wayne. 1975. "Where Is Argument?" Argumentation and Advocacy, XIII 129-132.

Eemeren, F.H. van, Grootendorst, R., Kruiger, T. 1987. Handbook of Argumentation Theory. Dordrecht: Foris Pubs.

Gilbert, Michael A. 1979. How to Win An Argument. McGraw-Hill, New York.

Govier, Trudy. 1987. Problems in Argument Analysis and Evaluation. Dordrecht: Foris Pubs.,.

Grice, P. 1975. "Logic and Conversation." in Studies In the Way of Words. Cambridge, MA: Harvard U.P.

Jackson, Sally, & Jacobs, Scott. 1980. "Structure of Conversational Argument: Pragmatic Bases for the Enthymeme." The Quarterly Journal of Speech. LXVI: 251-265.

Johnson, R.H., and Blair, J.A. 1983. Logical Self-Defense. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson,. p. 171.

Johnson, R.H. and Blair, J.A. 1987. "Argumentation As Dialectical." Argumentation, I: 41-56.

Legge, Nancy J.. 1990. "'What Did You Mean By That?': The Function of Perceptions in Interpersonal Argument." Argumentation and Advocacy, XXIX:2:41-60.

Moulton, Janice. 1983. "A Paradigm of Philosophy: The Adversary Method." in Harding, Sandra and Hintikka, Merrill B. Discovering Reality: Feminist Perspectives on Epistemology, and Philosophy of Science. Synthese Library, Vol. 161. Holland: D. Reidel..

Nye, Andrea. 1990. Words of Power. New York: Routledge.

O'Keefe, D.J. 1982. "The Concepts of Argument and Arguing." In Cox, Robert and Willard, Charles. Advances in Argumentation Theory and Research. Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press.

Rescher, Nicholas. 1977. Dialectics: A Controversy-Oriented Approach to the Theory of Knowledge. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.

Walton, D. 1990 "What Is Reasoning? What Is an Argument?" Journal of Philosophy, LXXXVII, 399-419.

Warren, Karen. 1988. "Critical Thinking and Feminism." Informal Logic, X: 31-44.

Willard, C.A. 1989. A Theory Of Argumentation. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.